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This paper considers the issues involved in estimating the effect of
military expenditure on growth and the reasons for the lack of consen-
sus in the literature. It briefly reviews the economic theory, emphasis-
ing the diffi cult identification issues involved in determining the inter-
action between military expenditure and output and discusses econo-
metric methods for panels. It then takes advantage of the extended
SIPRI military spending to construct a relatively large balanced panel
of countries for the period 1960-2014. Rather than the usual focus on
the direct relation between military spending on growth, it focusses
upon the investment channel. It provides estimates of various models
examining the interaction between the three variables and finds that
the data do not suggest any strong relations between military expen-
diture and either investment or growth. This is not unexpected given
the theoretical and econometric problems identified.
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1 Introduction
The effect of military expenditure on growth has been an issue of concern
to those interested in the economics of defence, since at least Benoit (1973).
Benoit seemed to find a positive effect of the share of military expenditure
on growth, but subsequent work did not confirm this relationship. The large
subsequent literature did not seem to indicate any robust empirical regularity,
positive or negative. Alptekin and Levine (2012) provide a meta-analysis of
number of studies and suggest that there may be a positive effect, while
Yesilyurt and Yesilyurt (2019) in a more recent meta analysis find evidence
consistent with their hypothesis of no effect. In contrast, Dunne and Tian
(2016) in a comprehensive survey of the literature argue that the effect is
likely to be negative in studies that include post Cold War data.1 With the
growth in the literature a number of issues that might lead one to expect a
heterogeneity of findings have had little attention.
The literature has tended to focus on the direct link between military
spending and growth and the possible channels of influence are seldom con-
sidered. This might reflect the fact that there is no agreed theory of economic
growth, though typically it is explained through a production function where
it depends on the growth in: material inputs, labour, capital and sometimes
also land and other natural resources; technology, perhaps measured by total
factor productivity; and utilisation, including Keynesian demand stimulus
effects, Dunne et al, 2005. Estimation faces diffi cult identification problems
because the two-way causality between output and military expenditure can
produce either positive or negative correlations between them. Thus inter-
preting whether the estimates are picking up a demand for military expen-
diture function, where military expenditure responds to output, or a supply
side effect where military expenditure effects output growth raises diffi cul-
ties. A further diffi culty is that we are trying to measure the effects of quite
small changes in military expenditure, which is itself usually a quite small
share of output. It only tends to be a large share of GDP in times of war
when there are many other influences on growth. In normal times one has to
separate these small effects of military expenditure from all the other factors
that influence variations in the growth rate. Finally, given we are trying to
estimate a small effect, so the estimate is likely to be sensitive to the data em-
1More general issues on the ‘peace dividend’, including the short-term effects of military
expenditure on output, are surveyed in Gleditsch et al. (1996) and Chan (1995).
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ployed (time-series, cross-section or panel; the countries and the time period
considered), the econometric methods used and the specification adopted
(Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel, 2005). 2 Fortunately, there now exists an
extended military spending dataset from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) which provides longer series than were available
for previous research and allowed a relatively large N large T balanced panel,
of 46 countries for the period 1960-1997, to be constructed for this analysis
(Perlo-Freeman and Skons; Perlo-Freeman, 2017)
This paper will review these issues and, rather than focusing on the direct
effect of military spending on growth, will emphasise the link from military
expenditure to growth through growth in capital stock determined by in-
vestment. Smith (1977,1980) are early studies of the association between
investment and military spending, more recent contributions are Dunne et al
(2002), Malizard (2015) and Kollias and Paleologou (2016). Section 2 uses a
standard growth model to examine the economic and security dimensions of
the relationship between military expenditure, investment and growth and
considers what the system implies for what we might observe. Section 3
discusses the estimation issues in panel data models. Section 4 presents es-
timates for a panel and subpanels of countries over the period 1960-2014.
Section 5 presents some some conclusions.
2 Theory
2.1 Military Expenditure in a neo-classical growth model.
To give some feel for the order of magnitude of the effects we are looking at
consider how military expenditure might be introduced into a simple Solow-
Swan growth model with an exogenous savings rate. Suppose output Yt is
determined through a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production
function by capital Kt (physical and human), labour enhancing technology





the parameter α measures the share of capital in output. The capital stock
is equal to gross investment, It, plus depreciated capital stock of the last
2The sensitivity of the results to estimation issues and choice of sample is illustrated
by the difference between the results of Attanasio et al. (2000) and Bond et al (2010) on
the time-series relationship between investment and growth.
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period, where δ is the rate of depreciation:
Kt = It−1 + (1− δ)Kt−1
output is devoted to consumption (public plus private), investment in phys-
ical and human capital and military expenditure:
Yt = Ct + It +Mt. (2)
Expressed as shares of output this is
1 = c+ i+m.
Suppose technology grows at rate g and labour force at rate n, define yt =
Yt/Lt and define (1−λ) ' (1−α)(n+g+δ). Then we can derive the familiar
transitional relationship determining growth in per-capita output:
∆ ln yt = κ+ (1− λ) [ln y∗t − ln yt−1] , (3)
where the steady state equilibrium level of output is
ln y∗t =
α
1− α ln(1− c−m)− ln(n+ g + δ) + gt, (4)
and κ is a constant that depends on initial conditions. Notice that equation
(3) can also be written in terms of the level of output rather than the growth
rate:
ln yt = κ+ (1− λ) ln y∗t + λ ln yt−1, (5)
and it will be more convenient to use this form below. Although it is common
to distinguish theories of the level of output like (5) from theories of the
growth rate like (3), formally they are indistinguishable as long as previous
output is included as a determinant.3 Therefore we will switch between
referring to the effect of military expenditure on output and the effect on
growth. Dunne et al (2015) provide a slightly different model in which the
effect of military spending is through its impact on the ’technology’term At,
but here we focus on the possible crowding out of investment.
This relationship has been widely estimated on cross country data, fol-
lowing Mankiw Romer Weil (1992), using investment in physical and human
3The empirical issues in distinguishing between them are discussed in Lee Pesaran and
Smith (1997).
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capital as measures of (1−c−m) with quite good empirical results. Although
there are various problems with translating this approach to the time-series
dimension, which we return to, it is a useful framework for thinking about
the economic influences on growth. Writing the relationship in terms of
(1− c−m), rather than the share of investment brings out the obvious point
that the share of military expenditure has a negative effect on the growth
rate during the transition to steady state by reducing the share of investment
for a given savings rate. In the very long-run, once the transition to steady
state is completed, the growth rate in per capita output is g and independent
of the savings rate and the share of military expenditure in output. OECD
countries may be close to steady state and Bond et al. (2010) do not find any
effect of investment on growth for them, though they do for less developed
countries.
This framework can be used to give an idea of the order of magnitude
of the effects we are looking for. Suppose investment was initially 15% of
GDP, the share of military expenditure was reduced from 5% to 4% of GDP
and this was all transmitted to increased investment. Using conventional
values, suppose α = 0.5, (n+g+δ) = 0.08, so (1− λ) = 0.04, then the cut in
military expenditure should raise the transitional growth rate by about 0.25%
per annum in the medium run. While this is not negligible, particularly when
cumulated over many years, it is small relative to the other noise in the data,
particularly for non-OECD countries.
In addition, within the context of this model this estimate may be an
upper limit since it assumes that military expenditure does displace invest-
ment, one for one. This was the assumption made in Smith (1980), which
like the Solow model assumed a closed economy, where total (public plus
private) savings (Y − C −M) was equal to total investment. However, in
an open-economy, total savings differs from total investment by the extent
of the balance of payments deficit or surplus. Then equation (2) becomes
Yt = Ct + It +Mt +Xt − St,
where Xt are exports and St imports.
The earlier sample used in Smith (1980) was dominated by the fixed
exchange rate, balance of payments contrained international system, in which
as the famous Feldstein-Horioka (1980) result showed, savings did tend to
equal investment. However, with floating exchange rates, the removal of
capital controls and globalisation, the balance of payments constraint was
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removed and savings did not equal investment, Coakley et al. (1996). So
increases in military expenditure that reduced savings no longer necessarily
reduce investment in the way that they earlier had. In particular, the US
was able to run a large balance of payments deficit, financing its investment
and military expenditure from the savings of the rest of the world.
One must also recognise that, military expenditure may influence other
parameters of the model, by changing the inducement to save, the rate of
technical progress, the rate of utilisation of labour and capital, the effective-
ness of human capital etc.4 In the case of these other parameters it is less
obvious what the direction of the effect will be let alone the size of the effect.
The discussion in this section suggests that the size of the likely effect
of a one percent increase in the share of military expenditure is at most a
reduction in the growth rate of one quarter of one percent and that this effect
is quite small relative to the other noise in the data. Cross country GDP time
series show the effects of numerous transitions which are large relative to the
effects of military expenditure. Positive transitions, when a country starts
to take-off and catch-up can raise growth rates by 5% per annum or more,
20 times the effect of a reduction in the share of military expenditure by one
percent. One explanation for such transitions is that in most poor countries
there are a range of institutional barriers to growth. If those barriers are
removed, countries rapidly exploit their potential for catch-up and take-off.
Negative transitions (wars, terms of trade shocks, financial crises or dysfunc-
tional policies) can have equally large effects. In countries going through
major negative transitions, like the former Soviet Union since 1990 the ef-
fects of even very large reductions in military expenditure can be swamped
by the effects of everything else that is going on. Even in relatively stable
countries like the US, it would be diffi cult to separate the contribution of
the post Cold-War reductions in military expenditure from the contribution
of all the other ‘New Economy’ factors to the higher productivity growth
in the mid-late 1990s. Given the importance of other factors and shocks
to growth, it is probably necessary to have quite sophisticated models of the
process to separate the small signal we are interested in (the effect of military
expenditure on growth) from the noise (everything else that is going on).
That said, the recent creation of an extended consistent military spending
database by SIPRI provided by SIPRI and the large changes in military
spending that occurred with the ending of the Cold War and the recent
4Deger and Sen (1995) discuss these possible linkages within a very similar framework
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growth in military spending, has provided variation in the data that did not
exist for the earlier studies, providing more leverage and potentially making
it easier to distinguish signal from noise in the data (Perlo-Freeman and
Skons; Perlo-Freeman, 2017).
2.2 Economic-Security interactions
Another issue that is seldom considered in the literature is the manner in
which security and econmy interact to produce the military spending growth
relation. For exposition, represent the economic relationship discussed above
as:
Yt = E(Mt, At) (6)
where At. technology is a short hand for all the other exogenous economic
determinants of output including institutions. We expect the effect of Mt on
Yt to be negative, though not large. To this economic relationship we need to
add a security relationship. This can be represented by a demand for military
expenditure function. This describes how the government determines its
optimal military expenditure in the light of a budget constraint, represented
by output, and measures of any hostile threats, Ht, from internal and external
enemies, given the support it receives from allies. It can be written:
Mt = S(Yt, Ht) (7)
The effect of Yt on Mt is positive. The size of the effect of Ht on Mt will
depend on the effectiveness of military preparations in countering the par-
ticular threats a country faces. Smith (1995) reviews models of this sort,
which have performed well empirically. However, in most of these optimising
models output is treated as exogenous and the feedback from military expen-
diture to output ignored. This account assumes that military expenditures
are the product of strategic perceptions and are not used as tools of economic
management to stabilise the economy. The historical evidence suggests that
this is a plausible assumption.
The economic and security dimensions give us two relationships between
Yt and Mt. Both growth and military expenditure are endogenous to this
system, which has an equilibrium given by the intersection of the two curves:
Yt = Y (At, Ht) (8)
Mt = M(At, Ht)
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If Ht and At were independent, then the observed correlation between Yt and
Mt will be positive if the variance of At is large relative to the variance of
Ht, and negative in the reverse case. This is exactly the same as the familiar
supply-demand example of the identification problem. If there are a lot of
supply shocks and no demand shocks, the movements in the supply curve will
trace out the constant demand curve. If there are a lot of demand shocks
and no supply shocks, the movements in the demand curve will trace out the
supply curve.
For illustration consider a very simple example. Suppose we have the
simultaneous system for a cross-section i = 1, 2, ..., N
mi = βmgi + εmi
gi = βgmi + εgi
where mi and gi are the share of military expenditure and the growth rate.
We assume βm > 0, fast growing economies can spend a larger share on the





















> 0, since βgβm < 0 so the sign of the regression of gi
on mi depends on









Suppose σmg = 0, demand and supply shocks are independent, which is a
common assumption, then Cov(gm) > 0 if
βmσgg + βgσmm > 0
βmσgg > −βgσmm
where both terms are positive since βg < 0. So the regression coeffi cient in
a regression of growth on burden is more likely to be positive if shocks to
growth, σgg, are large and negative if shocks to military expenditure, σmm,
are large.
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To be more specific, in the case of military expenditure if economic de-
terminants of growth, At, are constant but there are variations in the threat,
Ht, we will observe a negative relationship between military expenditure and
output. On the other hand, if the threat is constant but the economic vari-
ables are changing we will observe a positive relationship between military
expenditure and output. At a qualitative level, this simple account can be
used to organise a lot of history. Consider examples of the four combinations
of growth and shares of military expenditure in output.
The first case is low military expenditure and high growth. After World
War II, Germany and Japan faced a relatively low threat because of US
security guarantees and as a result had low shares of military expenditure.
This led to higher investment which because of the growth enhancing environ-
ment they faced generated a high rate of return and high rates of growth. The
growth enhancing environment was the gap with the technological leader, the
US, and patterns of education and openness which allowed them to transfer
the technology. As they got richer, closer to the technological leader, the
potential for this sort of technology transfer was reduced and their growth
rates dropped.
The second case is high military expenditure and high growth. Taiwan
and South Korea faced high levels of threat, from China and North Korea
respectively. It was a type of threat that military expenditure was quite
effective in providing defence against, so they both spent quite a large pro-
portion of GDP on the military. But both had a growth enhancing economic
environment with high returns on investment in physical and human capital
and high potential for catch-up from technology transfer which offset the
depressing effect of military expenditure.
The third case is low military expenditure and low growth. The countries
of Sub-Saharan Africa faced many threats, mainly internal, but they were
threats against which military expenditure was relatively ineffective, so they
spent relatively little on military expenditure: 1.8% of GDP compared to
2.1% in East Asia and 2.6% in South Asia (Collier and Gunning 1999).
Because they had a growth inhibiting environment (wars, dysfunctional state
policies, etc) they did not benefit from potential catch-up, so had low growth
and low military expenditure.
The final case is high military expenditure and low growth. The So-
viet Union perceived a threat against which military expenditure was seen
as quite effective (challenging US hegemony and maintaining the status quo
within the Warsaw Pact) so it devoted a high share of output to the mil-
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itary. Added to this depressing effect, the economic environment was not
growth enhancing. In particular, despite the efforts of the KGB to acquire
technology, the political system inhibited technology transfer and adoption
of foreign organisational practices. As a result the Soviet Union grew slowly
and eventually the economic failure, to which the high military burden con-
tributed, caused the system to collapse. While many other factors need to
be added to these highly simplified accounts, these cases provide examples
for all four possible combinations of growth and military expenditure.
3 Econometric Methods
3.1 Issues
For quantitative analysis of the economic effect of military expenditure on
growth one needs to be able to specify the relevant economic determinants of
growth (which are disputed) within a specific theoretical model and provide
some measure of the exogenous threat and the effectiveness of military ex-
penditure in countering it. In addition, the threat and military expenditure
have to vary suffi ciently to enable the data to trace out the economic di-
mension of the relationship. Quite apart from the technical details (choosing
functional form, stochastic specification, appropriate proxies, etc.) this is
not a straightforward agenda. If there is not enough independent exogenous
variation in the data, it will be impossible to measure the effect of military
expenditure on growth, even if the model is formally identified. Murdoch
et al. (1997) emphasised this problem and argue that it can be avoided by
pooling time-series and cross-section data for a fairly homogenous cohort of
countries. They noted that pooling circumvents both the lack of variation
in time-series and the problem of grouping nations with vastly different eco-
nomic systems associated with large cross-section studies. This is certainly
correct as long as the cross-section and the time-series variation are measuring
the same parameters, but there are many cases where cross-section estimate
of the relationship between two variables is quite different, e.g. opposite sign,
from the time-series estimate. It is possible that the time-series relationship
between military expenditure and growth is measuring the short-run effect
of military expenditure on output (which is likely to be positive because of
utilisation effects) while the cross-section relationship measures the long-run
effect (which is likely to be negative because of investment displacement).
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As another example, the general result from cross-sections is that investment
has a positive effect on growth, but using panel time-series Attanasio et al.
(2000) find that investment has a negative effect on growth. The pooled
relationship is then a weighted average of the cross-section and time-series
effects.
There is the further factor that estimation of demand for military ex-
penditure functions, the security relationship, have been most successful in
time-series. This is partly because it is diffi cult to get measures of the threat
which are comparable across countries and can be used in cross-sections.
Growth equations, the economic relationship, have been most sucessful in
cross-section, since, in time-series it is diffi cult to separate the short-run
demand side cyclical effects on output from the medium-term supply side
growth effects.
3.2 Estimators
The remainder of this section reviews the estimators available for panel data.
Essentially the estimators differ in how they treat parameter heterogeneity
over countries and over time. Suppose we have a panel of data for countries
j = 1, 2, ..., N and years t = 1, 2, ..., T. The simplest panel estimator is pooled
OLS which just estimates a model of the form:
yjt = α + βxjt + ujt
on all the data. It assumes that all the parameters are the same for each
country. The most common panel estimator is the (one way) fixed effect
estimator, which allows the intercept to differ over countries:
yjt = αj + βxjt + ujt.
This estimator only uses the within-group variation and is equivalent to the
regression:









In taking deviations from group means it ignores all the information in the
between-group cross-section relation:
yj = a+ bxj + ei.
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Pooled OLS treats both types of information equivalently. This may not
be appropriate if the cross section coeffi cient b measures something different
from the time-series coeffi cient β. There is an estimator which is intermedi-
ate between pooled OLS and the fixed effect estimator, the random effect
estimator, but we will not consider that.
One could also allow for both time and country effects to give the two
way fixed effect estimator:
yjt = αt + αj + βxjt + ujt.
This may capture cross-section dependence in the errors by allowing for a
completely flexible trend common to all countries .
In dynamic models of the form
yjt = αj + βxjt + λyj,t−1 + ujt
the fixed effect estimator is not consistent as N →∞, for fixed T, because of
the familiar lagged dependent variable bias because of the initial conditions.
This biases the OLS estimator of λ downwards. However, it is consistent as
T →∞, and for samples of our size the bias is small. If the parameters differ
over groups, i.e. the true model is
yjt = αj + βjxjt + λjyj,t−1 + ejt
then the pooled OLS and fixed effect estimators are subject to a different,
heterogeneity, bias discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995). This arises be-
cause the error in the fixed effect equation is
ujt = ejt + (βj − β)xjt + (λj − λ)yj,t−1
which will be correlated with the regressors. Unlike the lagged dependent
bias this biases the estimate of λ upwards (in the standard case where xit is
positively serially correlated) towards unity. The bias in the long-run effect is
smaller because the estimate of β is biased down and that of λ biased up and
these two cancel out, to some extent, in estimating β/(1−λ). In cases where
T is large, this bias can be avoided by estimating each equation individually,
not imposing homogeneity, and then taking a weighted or unweighted average
of the individual estimates, the Mean Group estimator (MG). A common
weighted average is the Random Coeffi cient Model estimator suggested by
Swamy (1970), which is one of a class of empirical Bayes estimators, reviews




The data for military spending is taken from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) extended military spending data, Perlo-
Freeman and Skons (2016), Perlo-Freeman, 2017).5 The Penn World Table
provides the data for GDP, population, investment as a share of GDP and
employment growth. .
The first step is to examine the relationship between the share of in-
vestment and the share of military expenditure in this data. The analysis
in Smith (1980) used 14 countries over 1954-1973. Two countries in that
sample (Austria and Switzerland) are not included in this sample and there
are five additional countries: Spain, Greece, Portugal, Norway and Turkey
in the OECD 17. For couuntries j = 1, 2, ..., N and years t = 1, 2, ..., T the
share of investment in GDP, ijt is made a function of the share of military
expenditure in GDP, mjt, the growth rate in GDP per capita, gjt, and the
growth rate in population pjt .
The first form estimated is pooled OLS (POLS) on all the data:
ijt = α + βmjt + γgjt + θpjt + ujt.
The second form estimated is a Fixed Effect Panel Estimator (FE) which
allows for a different intercept for each country:
ijt = αj + βmjt + γgjt + θpjt + ujt.
The third form estimates a separate regression for each country
ijt = αj + βjmjt + γjgjt + θjpjt + ujt,
and then computes the Mean Group (MG) estimator of the mean of the
coeffi cients. A cross section regression using the whole time period means is
also reported.
In addition, a dynamic model with error correction form was estimated
using fixed effects, pooled mean group (PMG), which allows the short run
5Military expenditure in the SIPRI database refers to all government spending on
current military forces and activities, including salaries and benefits, operational expenses,
arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, and
central administration, command and support.
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coeffi cents to differ across countries but with common long run coeffi cients
and the mean group (MG), which allows all coeffi cents to differ.
∆ijt = α1j + α2∆mjt + α3∆gjt + α4∆pjt + ρ(βmjt−1 + γgjt−1 + θpjt−1) + ujt.
The model was initially estimated over three samples. The first, N=46
is all countries with data for the whole period, the second is all N=25 is
all present OECD countries with data for the whole period, excluding Lux-
embourg which behaves strangely, the third is a group of the larger N=17
OECD countries, which is close to those covered by Smith (1980) for the pe-
riod 1961-1975. The full balanced panel runs from 1960 to 2014 and two sub
samples are created for the period up to the ending of the Cold War (1960-
85) and the later post Cold War period, 1986-2014. This is to see whether
we can replicate the earlier results on this data, which is rather different in
some respects and the extent to which the results are sensitive to period and
set of countries used.
Table 1 shows the estimates of β and their t statistic values for the dif-
ferent specifications and samples, with estimates in bold significant at 10%
or less. Estimates of γ are not reported, but were always positive, though of
varying significance. The first noticeable thing is the variety of results across
the methods and samples. The range of these estimates and of their signif-
icance indicates the sensitivity of the results to the treatment of parameter
heterogeneity in the panel. There are some features, but they are not well
pronounced. The static estimates for the whole period show significant pos-
itive coeffi cients, particularly for the FE and no significant negative effects,
but the dynamic results in particular the PMG and MG show significant
negative estimates. When the results are broken down into the two peri-
ods, the earlier period now shows more negative coeffi cients than the later,
for the static model and larger samples, but the dynamic models give larger
significant negative coeffi cients for the dynamic specfications. Cross country
averages were also estimated, but were all insignificant.
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Table 1. Estimates of β, the (long-run) effect of the share of




1960− 2014 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 0.22 0.32 0.09 0.33 −0.35 −3.14
NT = 2484 (4.8) (5.2) (0.1) (1.8) (−2.0) (−2.0)
N = 25 0.04 0.46 −0.32 0.15 −0.61 −5.56
(1.0) (8.1) (−0.2) (1.1) (−2.8) (−2.0)
N = 17 −0.07 0.92 −0.62 −1.01 −0.94 −7.24
(−0.7) (8.0) (−0.4) (−2.6) (−3.6) (−1.8)
First period: 1960-85
Static Dynamic
1960− 85 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 0.19 −0.09 −0.92 0.33 −1.57 −2.68
NT = 1350 (3.1) (−0.9) (−1.2) (1.1) (−4.4) (−1.7)
N = 25 0.05 −0.004 −2.53 0.04 −2.00 −6.34
(0.9) (−0.1) (−2.2) (0.2) (−4.4) (−2.5)
N = 17 −0.62 −0.79 −2.0 −2.15 −2.14 −7.07
(−3.9) (−3.7) (−1.6) (−3.8) (−4.8) (−2.0)
Second period: 1986-2014
Static Dynamic
1986− 2014 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 0.32 0.17 0.22 −0.35 0.33 −0.61
NT = 918 (5.3) (0.7) (4.8) (−2.0) (1.9) (−2.0)
N = 25 0.46 −0.03 0.04 −0.61 0.15 −5.56
(8.1) (−0.1) (1.0) (−2.8) (1.1) (−2.0)
N = 17 0.92 −0.68 −0.07 −0.94 −1.00 −7.20
(8.0) (−1.0) (−0.7) (−3.6) (−2.6) (−1.8)
Unlike the earlier period, covered in Smith (1980), there is no consistent
result of a negative effect of the share of military expenditure on the share
of investment. There is evidence that allowing for the short run dynamics
and heterogeneous coeffi cients makes a negative result more likely and for
the second period there is more evidence for a negative effect in the N=17
group. But there is quite a larage dispersion in the estimates.
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The theory was based on a fixed savings ratio where military expendi-
ture displaced investment, but national savings determines investment only
in a closed economy. In an open economy, which many of these countries in-
creasingly became over the period, investment can be financed from abroad,
breaking the link to some extent. Certainly, economies have become more
open to capital flows over this period and the assumption of a fixed savings
ratio is also questionable. So it is not surprising that the relation becomes
more complex, less well defined and affected by heterogeneity.
4.2 Growth
The model of growth in section 2.1 was
∆yt = κ+ (1− λ) [y∗t − yt−1] , (9)
where the steady state equilibrium level of output is
y∗t =
α
1− α ln(1− c−m)− ln(n+ g + δ) + gt, (10)
and this would suggest an approximation of the form:
∆yjt = a+ b ln ijt + c lnmjt + d ln(njt + g + δ) + eyjt−1 + ft
where yjt is per-capita GDP, ijt the share of investment in GDP, mjt is the
share of military expenditure in GDP, njt is the rate of growth of population.
For estimation g+ δ was set equal to 0.05. As an example, the one way fixed
effects estimates and (t ratios) for the OECD countries N=25 were
αi lnmj ln ij ln(nit + g + δ) ln yt−1 t
−0.019 0.079 −0.047 −0.062 0.001 R2 = 0.306
(−5.67) (16.23) (−4.25) (−10.85) (4.80) SER = 0.024
These show a well specified growth equation and a clear negative and
significant effect of military burden on growth and a positive significant ef-
fect of investment. Breaking down by sample and period gave the results in
Table 2. In contrast to the investment function results, the growth model re-
sults give consistently negative coeffi cient, though significance varies greatly.
When the dynamic models are used, the coeffi cients are often more negative,
though the dynamic MG does given some strange results, probably because
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of extreme values. When Japan was dropped from the 25 country sample the
whole period results for the dynamic model became significant.
Table 2 Growth Model estimates of (long-run) coeffi cient of mil-
itary expenditure on growth
Results for whole period 1960-2014
Static Dynamic
1960− 2014 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 −0.003 −0.014 −0.007 −0.302 −0.256 −3.841
(−2.69) (−6.08) (−4.36) (−3.73) (−5.41) (−0.70)
N = 25 −0.0004 −0.019 −0.023 −0.402 −0.118 −2.586
(−0.36) −5.67 −1.96 −3.94 −2.28 −0.90
N = 17 −0.008 −0.017 −0.027 −0.222 −0.317 3.894
−3.47 −4.12 −1.68 −2.85 −2.28 0.90
Results for 1960-85
Static Dynamic
1960− 85 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 −0.004 −0.010 −0.039 −0.057 −0.082 −0.232
−2.09 −2.39 −2.73 −0.66 −2.73 −1.77
N = 25 −0.002 −0.008 −0.059 −0.035 0.021 −0.169
−1.32 −1.42 −2.69 −0.37 0.49 −0.91
N = 17 −0.014 −0.003 −0.074 0.152 0.138 −0.350
−4.33 −0.037 −2.43 1.38 1.81 −1.65
Results for 1986-2014
Static Dynamic
1986− 2014 OLS FE MG DFE PMG MG
N = 46 −0.001 −0.008 −0.050 −0.105 −0.284 −0.509
−0.50 −2.00 −4.57 −1.37 −4.89 −2.31
N = 25 −0.003 −0.023 −0.079 −0.427 −0.809 −0.857
1.58 −4.14 −5.44 −2.91 −2.86 −2.93
N = 17 0.001 −0.028 −0.079 −0.427 −0.809 −0.857
0.26 −3.87 −4.02 −1.45 −2.23 −2.15
Breaking down the time period into the earlier and lower groups showed
the later period to generally have higher numbers of significant negative
coeffi cients that are also larger negative. So the general conclusion from the
growth model is of a consistent negative effect driven by the post 1985 data.
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4.3 VAR
Above, we should strictly have treated military expenditure, growth and
investment as jointly endogenous. We now do this, by estimating trivariate
VARs following the approach of Attanasio et al. (2000). A two-way fixed
effect VAR(2) takes the form






























We report in Table 3 the persistence, and in Table 4 the long-run effects,
.Given the known sensitivity of VARs to reduced numbers of observations,
the estimations is only done for the full period. Table 3 shows the results
for persistence, the sum of the coeffi cients on the lagged dependent variable,
which are relatively consistent across the samples and consistent with earlier
results. The military expenditure share persistence has a value of 0.92 for
the whole sample and 0.93 for the large OECD country sample, Investment,
the investment share, also shows high persistence and Growth, the growth of
GDP) shows relatively low persistence, all coeffi cients were strongly signifi-
cant. Estimating a first order VAR gave similar results.
Table 3. Persistence in the VAR1 and VAR2.
VAR2 VAR1 VAR1 VAR2 VAR1 VAR2
N=46 N=25 N=16
Growth 0.302 0.245 0.366 0.311 0.325 0.247
Investment 0.815 0.817 0.786 0.787 0.812 0.821
Milex 0.918 0.921 0.933 0.931 0.885 0.897
Table 4 Long run effects of the share of military expenditure
VAR2 VAR1
Growth p-value Invest p-value Growth p-value Invest p-value
N=46 -0.05 0.29 0.07 0.27 -0.02 0.61 0.05 0.16
N=25 -0.01 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.86 0.04 0.29
N=16 -0.02 0.81 -0.20 0.28 -0.06 0.63 -0.42 0.67
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Table 4 shows the estimated long-run effects of military expenditure, the
sum of the coeffi cients on military spending divided by one minus the sum of
the coeffi cients on the lagged dependent variable, for growth and the invest-
ment share. Also given is the p-value, for the hypothesis of zero coeffi cients
on military spending: no Granger causality..The effects of military expen-
diture on growth are nearly all negative, but all are insignificant, -0.05 for
the full sample and lower at -0.01 for the large OECD sample and -0.02 for
N=16. The long-run effect of military expenditure on investment is 0.07 in
the VAR(2), but is not significant and nor are any of the other coeffi cients.
Military expenditure is not Granger-causal for either growth or investment
in these VARs. As with the recent findings of Kollias and Paleogolou (2017),
there is again, little evidence of a robust quantitative link between military
expenditure and growth, or investment when using VAR methods.
5 Conclusions.
In the context of a growing literature with a lack of consensus, this paper has
provided a survey of the theoretical and empirical issues involved in studying
the interaction between military expenditure, investment and growth and the
econometric issues in estimating the effects of military expenditure throught
the investment channel. A range of empirical results for a balanced panel
of countries over the period 1960 to 2014, suggested that the negative rela-
tionship between military expenditure and investment noted in Smith (1980)
is no longer so clearly apparent in the data. Instead the range of results
depending on sample, specification and and estimation method suggest, in
line with the theoretical discussion, that it is somewhat diffi cult to estimate
a precise effect of military expenditure on growth. The estimates were very
sensitive to the precise way that heterogeneity in the panel was treated and
one could obtain quite different estimates with different estimators. This
is a common feature of the empirical growth literature and not peculiar to
measuring the effect of military expenditure.
Identification is a major issue. The observed correlation between output
and military expenditure is likely to be negative if the system is driven by
strategic shocks and positive if it is driven by economic shocks. In order
to address the identification question it is necessary to estimate a demand
for military expenditure function as a simultaneous system with the output
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and investment equations. Estimating the demand for military spending is
not straightforward because of the diffi culty of measuring strategic factors as
Cavatorta & Smith (2017) discuss. Specifying a structural exogenous growth
model with the share in military spending included, does seem to provide
support for a negative effect, but again there are differences over time and
considerable heterogeneity. This might suggest that more work needs to be
done on developing a better structural model for the analysis and d’Agostino
et al (2017) certainly get better results and consistent negative effects using
an endogenous rather than an exogenous growth model specification.
One possibility is to consider the joint estimation of the demand and
supply system. The demand for military expenditure raises some interesting
issues because there is both a cross-section dimension (burden sharing) and
the time-series dimension through the national budget constraint and varia-
tions in the threat. It is not clear that simultaneity bias is a major problem
with the estimates presented here, since the VAR estimates suggested that
military expenditure was independent of investment and growth, allowing it
to be treated as exogenous. This lack of association could be the product of
omitting relevant economic and strategic control variables, but it does suggest
that the effects of military expenditure are rather small. There is certainly
little evidence of any robust quantitative link between military expenditure
and growth and so little evidence to suggest that a policy of increasing mil-
itary spending would provide a useful means of increasing investment and
growth.
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Appendix
Sample N=46:
Argentina , Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany,
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Greece, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria. Norway, Pak-
istan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bo-
livarian Republic of),
Sample N=25 (* N=17 sample):
Australia *, Austria, Belgium*, Canada*, Chile, Denmark*, Finland, France*,
Germany*, Greece*, Ireland, Israel, Japan* (dropped for N=16), Italy*, Mexico,
Netherlands*, New Zealand, Norway*, Portugal*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland,
Turkey*, United Kingdom*, United States*.
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